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Abstract
The integration of renewable sources poses challenges at the operational and economic levels of
the power grid. In terms of keeping the balance between supply and demand, the usual scheme of
supply following load may not be appropriate for large penetration levels of uncertain and intermittent
renewable supply. In this paper, we focus on an alternative scheme in which the load follows the supply,
exploiting the flexibility associated with the demand side. We consider a model of flexible loads that
are to be serviced by zero-marginal cost renewable power together with conventional generation if
necessary. Each load demands 1 kW for a specified number of time slots within an operational period.
The flexibility of a load resides in the fact that the service may be delivered over any slots within
the operational period. Loads therefore require flexible energy services that are differentiated by the
demanded duration. We focus on two problems associated with durations-differentiated loads. The first
problem deals with the operational decisions that a supplier has to make to serve a given set of duration
differentiated loads. The second problem focuses on a market implementation for duration differentiated
services. We give necessary and sufficient conditions under which the available power can service the
loads, and we describe an algorithm that constructs an appropriate allocation. In the event the available
supply is inadequate, we characterize the minimum amount of power that must be purchased to service
the loads. Next we consider a forward market where consumers can purchase duration differentiated
energy services. We first characterize social welfare maximizing allocations in this forward market and
then show the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium. We also investigate the competitive
equilibrium in a sequence of real-time spot markets with flexible loads. We show by an example that
the sequence of real-time markets may not be efficient.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The worldwide interest in renewable energy such as wind and solar is driven by pressing
environmental problems, energy supply security and nuclear power safety concerns. The energy
production from these renewable sources is variable: uncontrollable, intermittent, uncertain.
Variability is a challenge to deep renewable integration.
A central problem is that of economically balancing demand and supply of electricity in the
presence of large amounts of variable generation. The current supply side approach is to absorb
the variability in operating reserves. Here, renewables are treated as negative demand, so the
variability appears as uncertainty in net load which is compensated by scheduling fast-acting
reserve generation. This strategy of tailoring supply to meet demand works at todays modest
penetration levels. But it will not scale. Recent studies in California, e.g., [1], project that the
load-following capacity requirements will need to increase from 2.3 GW to 4.4 GW. These large
increases in reserves will significantly raise electricity cost, and diminish the net carbon benefit
from renewables as argued in several papers in the literature ([2], [3]).
There is an emerging consensus that demand side resources must play a key role in supplying
zero-emissions regulation services that are necessary for deep renewable integration (e.g., [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8]). These include thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs), electric vehicles (EVs),
and smart appliances. Some of these loads are deferrable: they can be shifted over time. For
example, charging of electrical vehicles (EVs) may be postponed to some degree. Other loads
such as HVAC units can be modulated within limits. The core idea of demand side approaches
to renewable integration is to exploit load flexibility to track variability in supply, i.e., to tailor
demand to match supply. For this a cluster manager or aggregator offers a control and business
interface between the loads and the system operator (SO).
The demand side approach has led to two streams of work: (a) indirect load control (ILC) where
flexible loads respond, in real-time, to price proxy signals, and (b) direct load control (DLC)
where flexible loads cede physical control of devices to operators who determine appropriate
actions. The advantage of DLC is that with greater control authority the cluster manager can
more reliably control the aggregate load. However, DLC requires a more extensive control and
communication infrastructure and the manager must provide economic incentives to recruit a
sufficient consumer base. The advantage of ILC is that the consumer retains authority over her
electricity consumption.
Both ILC and DLC require appropriate economic incentives for the consumers. In ILC, the real-
time price signals provides the required incentives. However, the quantification of those prices,
the feasibility of consumer response and the impact on the system and market operations in
terms of price volatility and instabilities is a matter of concern, as recent literature suggest ([9],
[10], [11]).
DLC also requires the creation of economic signals, but unlike real-time pricing schemes DLC
can use forward markets. For DLC to be effective, it is necessary to offer consumers who
present greater demand flexibility a larger discount. The discounted pricing can be arranged
through flexibility-differentiated electricity markets. Here, electricity is regarded as a set of
differentiated services as opposed to a homogeneous commodity. Consumers can purchase an
appropriate bundle of services that best meets their electricity needs. From the producer’s
perspective, providing differentiated services may better accommodate supply variability. This
paper is concerned with electric power services differentiated by the duration h for which power
is supplied. We explore balancing supply and demand for such services through forward markets.
There is a growing body of work [12], [13], [14], [15] on differentiated electricity services.
A. Prior Work
Supply side approaches
Here, variable supply from renewable sources is regarded as negative demand. The objective
is to arrange for reserve power generation to compensate for fluctuations in net demand. The
problem is formulated from the viewpoint of the system operator (SO) who must purchase
reserve generation capacity and energy to meet the random demand while minimizing the risk of
mismatch and the cost of reserves. Reserve generation can be purchased in forward markets with
different time horizons (day-ahead, hour-ahead, 5 minutes-ahead). With shorter time horizons,
the uncertainty in the forecast net demand is reduced but the cost of reserves increases. The
SO’s optimal decision can be formulated as a stochastic control problem known as risk-limiting
dispatch presented in [13]. When SO’s decisions include unit commitment and transmission
constraints, the problem is a mixed-integer nonlinear stochastic programming problem that is
computationally challenging as discussed in [16]. A number of papers address the computational
aspects of stochastic unit commitment (e.g., [17], [18], [19]). Alternatively, [20] present a robust
optimization formulation of the unit commitment problem. If unit commitment and transmission
constraints are omitted, the resulting stochastic dispatch problem has an analytical solution as
shown in [21], [22].
Demand side approaches
Current research in direct load control focuses on developing and analyzing algorithms for
coordinating resources (e.g., [23], [24], [25], [26]). For example, [27] develops a distributed
scheduling protocol for electric vehicle charging; [6] uses approximate dynamic programming
to couple wind generation with deferrable loads; and [28], [29], [5] suggest the use of receding
horizon control approaches for resource scheduling.
Recent studies in indirect load control have developed real-time pricing algorithms [30] and
quantified operational benefits [31]. There has also been research focused on economic efficiency
in [32], [33], feedback stability of price signals in [9], volatility of real-time markets in [11] as
well as the practical issues associated with implementing ILC programs presented in [10].
An early exposition of differentiated energy services is offered in [34]. There are other approaches
to such services that naturally serve to integrate variable generation sources. Reliability differ-
entiated energy services where consumers accept contracts for p MW of power with probability
ρ are developed in [12]. More recently, the works of [35], [15] consider deadline differentiated
contracts where consumers receive price discounts for offering larger windows for the delivery
of E MWh of energy.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we consider a class of flexible loads that require a fixed power level for a specified
duration within an operational period. The loads are differentiated based on the duration of
service they require, we refer to them as duration-differentiated (DD) loads. We consider a
stylized version of DD loads. The service interval is divided into T slots, indexed t = 1, · · · , T .
A flexible load demands 1 kW of power for a duration of h slots. While this abstraction does
not account for many important practical constraints, it serves to formulate and study the central
mathematical problems in scheduling/control and markets for DD loads. The flexibility of a load
resides in the fact that any h of the available T slots will satisfy the load. Examples of DD loads
include electric vehicles that allow flexible charging over an 8 hour service interval, aluminum
smelters that might operate for h hours out of 24, appliances such as washing machines that
require a fixed power for any 1 hour out of the next 8.
Our objective is to study the allocation of available supply to the various loads in a market
context. We assume that if the supplier contracts ex ante to deliver power for h slots to a particular
flexible load, it is obligated to do so. The supplier selects h of the the available T slots to supply
power to the load. This scheme requires certain technology infrastructure (communication, power
electronics), a treatment of which is outside the scope of this paper. The load is not informed
much in advance which h slots it will receive power. Thus the load must assume the burden of
planning its consumption without knowing exactly when power will be available. The available
power is drawn from zero-marginal cost renewable sources as well as electricity purchases made
by the supplier in the day-ahead. Because of the variability in renewable sources, the supplier
may be compelled to use supplemental generation such as on-site gas turbine or buying from a
real-time market to meet its obligations.
Our first set of results are contained in Section III. Here, we study the decision problems faced
by a supplier who has to serve a fixed set of DD loads. The basic question we address is the
following: given a forecast model of its renewable generation, what day-ahead and real time
power purchases should a supplier make to ensure that all loads are served at least possible
cost? To solve this problem, we first give a necessary and sufficient condition under which the
available power p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ) is adequate to meet the loads. We describe a Least Laxity
First (LLF) algorithm that constructs an appropriate allocation to serve the loads. In the event the
available supply profile p does not meet the adequacy condition, we characterize the minimum
cost power purchase decisions under (a) oracle information, and (b) run-time information about
the supply. We use this solution to construct optimal day-ahead and real-time decisions for the
supplier in Section IV.
Our second set of results may be found in Section V. Here, we consider a stylized forward
market for duration-differentiated services, which are bundles of h 1-kW slots sold at prices
pi(h), h = 1, 2, · · · . Consumer i select the service h that maximizes her net utility U(h)− pi(h),
and the supplier bundles its supply (both its renewable generation and any forward purchases
made from the grid) into nh units of service for h slots, so as to maximize its revenue. We show
that there is a competitive market equilibrium which maximizes social welfare. The competitive
duration-differentiated market equilibrium is then compared with a sequential real-time market, in
which the price of power ζ(t) is the market clearing price for slot t. The comparison reveals that
the real-time markets may not be efficient. All proofs are collated in the Appendix. Concluding
remarks and future research avenues are discussed in Section VII.
Notation
Bold letters denote vectors. We reserve subscripts t to index time and i to index loads. For a
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ), a↓ denotes the non-increasing rearrangement of a, so, a
↓
t ≥ a↓t+1 for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. For an assertion A, 1A denotes 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We formalize the two problems investigated in this work. The first problem deals with the
operational decisions that a supplier has to make to serve a given set of duration differentiated
loads. The second problem focuses on a market implementation for duration differentiated
services.
A. Serving a collection of duration differentiated loads
We consider a discrete-time setting where time is segmented into T slots, indexed by t. The power
available in slot t is assumed to take non-negative integer values. There are N flexible loads,
indexed by i. Load i requires 1 kW for any hi of T time slots. The vector h = (h1, h2, . . . , hN)
is called the demand profile. For a demand profile h, we define an associated demand-duration
vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dT ) where dt :=
∑
i 1{t≤hi}. Note that the number of consumers that
need service for t slots is dt − dt+1 (where dT+1 := 0). Thus, there is a bijection between the
demand profile and the demand-duration vector as h specifies d uniquely and vice versa.
We consider the supplier’s problem of serving a given collection of these loads. The supplier
owns renewable energy resources that can provide free but uncertain power. In addition, the
supplier can purchase power in the day-ahead and real-time electricity markets. The renewable
generation over the delivery period is denoted by the non-negative integer-valued random vector
R = (R1, R2, . . . , RT ); the realizations of this vector are denoted by r. In the day-ahead market,
the supplier has a probability mass function on this random vector given by f(r). If the supplier
purchases a power profile y = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ) in the day-ahead market, its cost is given by
cda(
∑T
t=1 yt), where c
da is day-ahead market price. In real-time, the random vector of renewable
generation takes a realization r, so that the total realized supply profile is p = r + y. Since,
this supply may not be adequate for serving all the loads, the supplier may have to purchase
additional energy at the real-time market price crt. We assume that over the time of actual
delivery, the supplier sequentially observes the true realizations of its renewable power in each
slot and makes a real-time purchase decision at in slot t according to a decision policy of the
form
at = gt(y, r1, r2, . . . , rt) (1)
For a given day-ahead purchase decision y and a real-time decision rule g = (g1, g2, . . . , gT ),
the supplier’s total expected cost is given as
J (y,g) := cda
T∑
t=1
yt + c
rtE
[
T∑
t=1
gt(y, R1, R2, . . . , Rt)
]
, (2)
where the expectation is over the random vector R. The supplier’s problem can be stated as
follows.
Problem 1. What choice of the day-ahead purchase decision y and the real-time decision rule
g = (g1, g2, . . . , gT ) minimizes the total expected cost given by (2) while ensuring that all loads
are served?
B. Forward market for flexible services
In Problem 1, the set of duration-differentiated loads was assumed to be fixed. We would like to
investigate how this set of duration-differentiated loads results from a market interaction between
consumers and suppliers. We consider a forward market for duration-differentiated services.
All the market transactions between the consumers and the suppliers are completed before the
operational period. The forward market has three elements:
(a) Services: The services are differentiated by the number h of time slots within T slots
during which 1 kW of electric power is to be delivered. Service h is sold at price pi(h).
(b) Consumers: The benefit to a consumer who receives h slots is U(h); all consumers have
the same utility function U .
(c) Supplier: The supplier receives for free the power with profile R = (R1, · · · , RT ). The
supplier cost is given by J (y,g) as defined by (2) in the previous section.
In order to make the analysis tractable, we focus on idealized market structure and supplier
behavior. In particular, we assume a competitive market setting in which all agents act as price
takers. We also assume that while making their market decisions, suppliers ignore the forecast
errors about their renewable supply. In this setting, we consider the following problem.
Problem 2. Is there a competitive equilbrium in the forward market for duration-differentiated
energy services? Is the equilibrium efficient, that is, does it maximize social welfare?
III. ADEQUACY RESULTS
In order to address Problem 1, we start with providing a characterization of the set of supply
profiles that are adequate for a given collection of loads. We then provide a closed-form expres-
sion for the minimum amount of power needed to make an inadequate supply adequate. We use
these results to identify the optimal day-ahead and real-time purchase decisions for the supplier.
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Fig. 1. Characterizing duration-differentiated loads (left), adequate supply profile (center), inadequate supply profile (right).
A. Adequacy conditions
Let pt be the power available in time slot t. The vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ) is the supply
profile. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which p is adequate for the given
collection of loads. Any allocation of supply to loads can be specified by a binary allocation
rule A ∈ {0, 1}N×T where A(i, t) = 1 if and only if load i receives power in slot t. We define
two notions of supply adequacy.
Definition 1 (Adequacy). The supply profile p = (p1, · · · , pT ) is adequate for the demand
profile h = (h1, · · · , hN) if there exists an allocation rule A(·, ·) such that∑
t
A(i, t) = hi,
∑
i
A(i, t) ≤ pt.
If further,
∑
i
A(i, t) = pt, we will say that p = (p1, · · · , pT ) is exactly adequate for h =
(h1, · · · , hN).
Example 1. Consider T = 6 time slots and N = 5 flexible loads as illustrated in Figure 1. If the
demand profile is h = (1, 2, 2, 3, 6), the associated demand-duration vector is d = (5, 4, 2, 1, 1, 1).
The supply profile shown in the center panel is exactly adequate to service the loads. The supply
profile shown in the right panel has the same total energy, but it is inadequate to service the
loads.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the above definition.
Lemma 1. If p is (exactly) adequate for a demand profile h, then any temporal rearrangement
of p is also (exactly) adequate for the same demand profile h.
We will characterize adequacy more directly via the demand-duration vector. For this we employ
some notions from majorization theory.
Definition 2 (Majorization). Let a = (a1, · · · , aT ) and b = (b1, · · · , bT ) be two non-negative
vectors. Denote by a↓,b↓ the non-increasing rearrangements of a and b respectively. We say
that a majorizes b, written a ≺ b, if
(i)
∑T
s=t a
↓
s ≤
∑T
s=t b
↓
s, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and
(ii)
∑T
s=1 a
↓
s =
∑T
s=1 b
↓
s.
If only the first condition holds, we say that a weakly majorizes b, written a ≺w b.
Remark 1. The inequalities in our definition of majorization are reversed from standard use in
majorization theory. This departure from convention allows us to write our adequacy conditions
as d ≺ p and d ≺w p which suggests the intuitive adequacy condition of demand being “less
than” supply .
Our next result characterizes adequacy.
Theorem 1 (ADEQUACY). (a) The supply profile p is exactly adequate for a demand profile
h with the associated demand-duration vector d if and only if d ≺ p.
(b) The supply profile p is adequate for a demand profile h with the associated demand-
duration vector d if and only if d ≺w p.
Proof: Proof See Appendix B.
B. Least Laxity Allocation
We now describe an allocation rule that will play a key role in this paper. Given an allocation
rule A, we define the laxity of load i at time t as xi(t) := T − t+ 1−
(
hi −
∑t−1
s=1A(i, s)
)
.
Definition 3 (LLF Allocation). Fix the supply profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ). The Least Laxity
Allocation rule A(i, t) is defined by
(i) At time 1, xi(1) = T −hi. Arrange the loads in non-decreasing order of xi(1) and let A1
be the collection of the first p1 loads from this order. Set A(i, 1) = 1 if and only if i ∈ A1.
(ii) At time t, xi(t) = T−t+1−
(
hi −
∑t−1
s=1A(i, s)
)
. Arrange loads in non-decreasing order
of xi(t) and let At be the collection of the first pt loads from this order. Set A(i, t) = 1 if
and only if i ∈ At.
As its name suggests, at each time t LLF gives priority to loads with smaller laxity. Our next
result shows that the LLF allocation successfully services the loads when the supply profile is
adequate. We have:
Theorem 2. If the supply profile p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ) is adequate, then the Least Laxity First
allocation rule satisfies all the demands, i.e.∑
t
A(i, t) = hi,
∑
i
A(i, t) ≤ pt
Proof: Proof See Appendix C.
C. Supplemental Power Purchases
It may happen that the supply profile is not adequate for a given demand profile. In this case,
the supplier will have to purchase additional power to serve the loads. We determine the least
costly increment in supply profile to make it adequate. We consider two scenarios: (a) Oracle
information: the entire supply profile p is revealed in advance, (b) Run-time information: the
power available in slot [t, t + 1) is revealed at time t, i.e. immediately before the beginning of
the slot.
Case (a): The supplier needs to serve a demand profile h with the associated demand-duration
vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dT ). Before the time of delivery, the supplier learns the true realization
of the entire supply profile p = (p1, . . . , pT ). If d ≺w p, the supply is adequate and there is
no need for supplemental power. In the case of inadequate supply, the additional power to be
purchased at minimum cost while ensuring that all demands are met is given by the solution of
the following optimization problem:
min
a≥0
T∑
t=1
c · at subject to d ≺w (p+ a),
where c ≥ 0 is the unit price of supplemental power. This is a linear programming problem
since the majorization inequalities are linear.
Case (b): The power available in each slot is revealed just before the beginning of that slot.
The supplier now faces a sequential decision-making problem where the information available
to make the purchase decision at at time t is d, p1, p2, . . . , pt. The supplier’s objective is to
minimize the total cost of additional power
∑T
t=1 c · at while ensuring that all load demands are
met.
Clearly the supplier’s optimal cost in Case (b) is lower bounded by its optimal cost in Case (a).
Surprisingly, it happens that the optimal costs and corresponding decision strategies are identical
in both situations. More precisely, we have:
Theorem 3. Consider the following decision strategy for the supplier:
(i) The additional power purchased at t = 1 is a1 = (dT − p1)+. The total power (p1 + a1) is
allocated to consumers according to the LLF policy described in Definition 3.
(ii) At time t, knowing the supply p1, p2, . . . , pt and the purchases a1, . . . , at−1, the power
purchased at is the solution of the following optimization problem:
min
at
at
s.t. (p1 + a1, p2 + a2, . . . , pt−1 + at−1, pt + at) w (dT−t+1, dT−t+2, . . . , dT ) (3)
The total power (pt + at) is allocated to consumers according to the LLF policy. Then,
(a) This strategy is optimal under both the oracle information and run-time information
cases.
(b) The optimal cost is c
(
maxt
(∑
s≥t(ds − p↓s)
)+).
Proof: Proof See Appendix D.
IV. THE SUPPLIER’S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We can now address Problem 1 described in Section II. Suppose the supplier purchases a power
profile y = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ) in the day-ahead market. In real-time, the renewable supply takes
a realization r, so that the total realized supply profile is p = r + y. Since, this supply may
not be adequate, the supplier would have to purchase real-time energy. The optimal policy for
making these real-time purchases is given by the decision strategy described in Theorem 3 with
the associated cost given as c
(
maxt
(∑
s≥t(ds − p↓s)
)+). Hence, the supplier’s total expected
cost is given as
J(y) = cda
T∑
t=1
yt + c
rtE
[
max
t
(∑
s≥t
(ds − (R+ y)↓s)
)+ ]
, (4)
where the expectation is over the renewable supply R. The supplier’s optimization problem now
is to choose y to minimize J(y). Recall that y is discrete-valued. However, by relaxing the
integer constraint on y, we get a convex optimization problem which can be used to provide
approximate solutions to supplier’s optimization problem.
Theorem 4. If we relax the constraint that y can take only integer values, then the supplier’s
objective function is convex in y.
Proof: See Appendix E.
V. FORWARD MARKET FOR DURATION-DIFFERENTIATED CONTRACTS
In the analysis presented in the previous sections, the set of duration-differentiated loads was
assumed to be fixed. In this section the problem of arriving to that fixed set is investigated.
We consider the case in which the fixed set of duration-differentiated loads is the outcome of a
market interaction between consumers and suppliers.
In particular, we consider a forward market for duration-differentiated services and investigate its
properties. Duration-differentiated services couple supply and consumption across different time
slots. A natural way to capture this is to consider a forward market for the whole operational
period where services of different durations are bought and sold. In this way, both consumers
and suppliers can effectively quantify the value/cost of consuming/producing these services. All
the market transactions are completed before the delivery time. Thus, the market decisions are
made prior to the operational decisions required for the delivery of the products which is a
characteristic of direct load control. In order to illustrate the advantages of forward markets, we
perform a comparison with a stylized real-time spot market implementation. The results shed
light about potential inefficiencies resulting from the implementation of spot markets in which
the inter-temporal dimension of duration-differentiated contracts is hard to capture.
In order to make the analysis tractable, we focus on idealized markets structures and consumers
and suppliers behaviors. In particular, we assume the following:
1) Competitive Market: Suppliers and consumers are assumed to be price takers without the
possibility of impact the market prices.
2) Certainty Equivalence: In order to make their market decision, the suppliers ignore the
uncertainty in their forecast by treating their expected value of renewable power as the true
realization.
The first assumption is standard in market analysis in which price are assumed to be exogenous
to the players decisions. The second assumption allows to simplify the suppliers problem in the
market setting. It avoids the need to consider the costs resulting from the two-stage optimiza-
tion problem presenting previously. By assuming this, the additional power cost will be just
cda
∑T
t=1 yt.
The information flow of the market is depicted in Figure 2. Facing a menu of services with
associated pricesM = {k, pi(k)}, consumer n selects a service hn that maximizes her net benefit,
while the supplier selects the number nt of services of duration t to produce that maximize her
net profit.
h1 h2 h3 · · · hN
M = {k, pi(k)}
(n1, n2, · · · , nT )
Fig. 2. Market implementation.
We first characterize the decisions that maximize total social welfare, defined as aggregate
consumer utility minus the cost of purchased energy. We then show that the optimum decisions
can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium. Lastly, we compare the competitive equilibrium
in a real-time spot market with the equilibrium for our duration-differentiated forward market.
A. Social Welfare Problem
We consider a set of homogenous consumers, consumer i = 1, . . . , N enjoys utility U(h) upon
consuming 1 kW of power for h slots. The supplier has available for free a quantity of power
with profile r = (r1, . . . , rT ), and can also purchase additional energy at cda per kW-slot. The
social welfare optimization problem is
max
h≥0,y≥0
N∑
i=1
U(hi)−
T∑
t=1
cdayt
subject to dt =
N∑
i=1
1{t≤hi}
y + r w d
Proof: Proof See Appendix F.
In the convex case, the utility increments are non-decreasing in h and the optimal allocation
favors longer duration contracts. In the concave case, the utility increments are non-increasing
in h and the optimal allocation favors the shortest durations.
Remark 2. In standard commodity markets, the usual setting is to consider concave utility
functions which reflects the decreasing marginal utility of many goods. In the case of duration-
differentiated loads, the concave case could represent situations in which additional hours of
consumption does not increase the marginal utility, for example the filtering of a pool beyond the
minimum numbers of hours. However, in this case convex utility functions are also of interest.
That could represent loads for which interruptions of the consumption is material. Examples
include industrial mining processes, power supply for computational applications, air flow in
hospitals.
Example 2. For example, take r = (5, 4, 2, 1, 1, 0), the number of consumers N = 14 and the
time period T = 6. In addition, the utility function for the convex case is such that
U(6)− U(5) ≥ cda. (10)
and for the concave case
U(1)− U(0) ≥ cda. (11)
Theorem 5 (SOCIAL WELFARE). Assume the profile r is arranged in decreasing order: r = r↓.
(a) (Convex utility) Suppose U(h)−U(h− 1) is a non-negative, non-decreasing function of
h (with U(0) = 0) and the number of consumers N is larger than r1. Define
k∗ =
 min k : k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (T − 1)},
U(T )−U(k)
T−k ≥ cda if this exists
T otherwise
(5)
If k∗ ≥ 1, the optimum demand duration is
d∗t =
 rt if t < k∗rk∗ if t ≥ k∗ (6)
If k∗ = 0, the optimum demand duration vector is d∗t = N for all t.
(b) (Concave utility) Suppose U(h) − U(h − 1) is a non-negative, non-increasing function
of h (with U(0) = 0) and the number of consumers N is larger than
∑
t rt. Define
k∗ =
 min k : k ∈ {1, . . . , T}, U(k)− U(k − 1) ≥ cda if this exists0 otherwise (7)
If k∗ ≥ 1, the optimum demand duration is
d∗t =
 N if t ≤ k∗0 if t > k∗ (8)
If k∗ = 0, the social welfare maximizing demand duration vector is
d∗t =

∑T
i=1 ri if t = 1
0 if t > 1
(9)
In the convex case the optimal allocation is is h = (1, 2, 2, 3, 6) as in Figure 3 (left). Note that
an additional unit of supply is utilized and used to create a contract of duration 6 hours. In the
concave case only contracts of duration 1 slots are required as in Figure 3 (middle). Note that in
this case, also an additional unit of supply is utilized to create an additional contract of duration
1.
h1 = 6
h2 = 3
h3 = 2
h4 = 2
h5 = 1
d = (5, 4, 2, 1, 1, 1)
...
...
hi = 1
d = (14, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) q = (5, 2, 4, 1, 1, 1)
Fig. 3. Optimal allocation for convex case (left), concave case (middle), number of interruptions in the convex case (right).
B. Competitive equilibrium
We now analyze a stylized forward market for the production and consumption of duration-
differentiated services. We focus on a perfect-competition setting in which prices are assumed to
be exogenous to the players’ decisions. Consequently, all players are price takers, i.e., they cannot
influence the prices. The perfect-competition setting is certainly an idealization but it provides
valuable insights in terms of market design. In particular, these outcomes are usually used as
a benchmark for analysis in which perfect-competition is not considered, e.g., monopolistic or
oligopolistic settings.
The market determines a price for each service, every consumer selects the service she wants
to maximize her net benefit, and the supplier decides how much of each service to produce.
If the demand and supply for each service match, a competitive equilibrium is said to exist.
Mathematically, a competitive equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Competitive Equilibrium). The supplier’s service production vector n = (n1, n2, . . . , nT ),
the consumers’ demand profile h = (h1, h2, . . . , hN), and a set {pi(h)} of prices constitute a
competitive equilibrium if three conditions hold:
(i) Consumer Surplus Maximization: hi ∈ arg maxh U(h)− pi(h), all i.
(ii) Profit Maximization: The services produced maximize profit, i.e. n solves this optimiza-
tion problem:
max
n≥0, y≥0
T∑
t=1
(ntpi(t)− Cyt)
subject to dt =
T∑
i=t
ni
r+ y w d
(iii) Market Clearing: The supply and demand for each service are equal: nt =
∑N
i=1 1{hi=t}.
Definition 5 (Efficiency). The competitive equilibrium is efficient if the resulting allocation
maximizes social welfare.
We next characterize efficient competitive equilibria for convex and concave utility functions.
Theorem 6 (EFFICIENT COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM). Assume the profile r is arranged in
decreasing order: r = r↓.
(a) (Convex utility) Suppose U(h) − U(h − 1) is non-decreasing (with U(0) = 0) and the
number of consumers N is larger than r1. Then an efficient competitive equilibrium exists
and is described as follows:
Prices: pi(h) = U(h).
Supplier’s production: Define k∗ as in (5). Then, if k∗ ≥ 1, nt = rt − rt+1 for t < k∗,
nt = 0, for k∗ ≤ t < T , and nT = rk∗ If k∗ = 0, the supplier’s production is nT = N .
Consumption: nt consumers purchase duration t service, so market is cleared.
(b) (Concave utility) Suppose U(h) − U(h − 1) is non-increasing (with U(0) = 0) and the
number of consumers N is larger than
∑
t rt. Then an efficient competitive equilibrium
exists and is described as follows:
Prices: pi(h) = min(cda, U(1))h.
Supplier’s production: Define k∗ as in (7). If k∗ ≥ 1, nk∗ = N If k∗ = 0, n1 =
∑
t rt and
nk = 0 for k > 1.
Consumption: nt consumers purchase duration t service, so market is cleared.
Proof: Proof See Appendix G.
Remark 3. In essence, Theorem 6 is reminiscent of the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics [36] which states that under certain conditions competitive equilibria are Pareto
efficient. Note that our market model differs from the standard market models since each
consumer faces a discrete choice [37]. Further, Theorem 6 is constructive in the sense that
it identifies an equilibrium price vector.
Remark 4. In the above analysis, the supply side represents an aggregation of many suppliers.
Note that individual price taking suppliers may benefit by coordinating to offer longer service
contracts in order to take advantage of higher prices for longer durations. We assume that the
suppliers are able to identify and exploit all such opportunities. We further assume that even with
such coordination the number of effective suppliers is large enough to justify the assumption of
a competitive market.
Remark 5. In the convex case, the marginal price of the hth slot, pi(h)−pi(h−1) is increasing.
This is due to the fact that from a given supply profile it may be possible to produce a m-
slot and a k-slot service but not a (m + k)-slot service, as can be seen from the definition of
adequacy. This contrasts with the assumption in [38] that, for conventional generator technology,
the marginal price of producing electricity for slot h decreases with h. In the concave case above
this issue does not arise since service of a single duration is produced.
Remark 6. Suppose the actual chronological profile of the power is q = (q1, · · · , qT ). Suppose
q has (m + 1) local minima. Then, in the market allocations in the convex case, each service
will have at most m interruptions. For the same example as before Figure 3 (right) shows that
there is at most one interruption since q = (5, 2, 4, 1, 1, 1) has two local minima.
C. Real-time vs duration-differentiated markets
We compare the duration-differentiated market with a real-time spot market that operates as
follows. At the beginning of slot t the market determines a price pit for 1kW of power delivered
during slot t. The price pit equates the supply function st(pi) and demand function qt(pi), i.e.,
st(pit) = qt(pit). We model these functions. The supply function is straightforward. At the
beginning of slot t, the supplier receives for free power rt and offers it for sale inelastically. She
can also supply as much power as she wishes at price C per kW-slot. Thus the supply function
is
s(pi) =

∞ if pi > crt
[pt,∞) if pi = crt
pt if pi < crt
. (12)
The demand function is a bit more complicated. At the beginning of slot t, consumer n determines
her willingness to pay vn(t) for 1 kW in slot t. So the (aggregate) demand function is
qt(pi) =
N∑
i=1
1{pi≤vn(t)}. (13)
The willingness to pay vn(t) will depend on the power that consumer n acquired in slots
1, · · · , t− 1. All consumers have the same utility function U(h). If consumer n had acquired x
kW-slots (out of a total of t− 1), her willingness to pay would equal the additional utility she
will gain,
vn(t) = U(x+ 1)− U(x). (14)
Thus the consumer is myopic: her willingness to pay is unaffected by her opportunities to make
future purchases in slots t+1, · · · , T . The demand function is obtained from (13) and (14). Note
that although consumers are myopic, their purchasing decisions depend on previous decisions.
Let xi, i = 0, · · · , t− 1, be the number of consumers that have purchased i kW-slots during the
first (t− 1) spot markets.
Consider the convex case: U(h)− U(h− 1) is non-decreasing. Here, the demand function is
qt(pi) =

0 if pi > U(t)− U(t− 1)
xt−1 if U(t)− U(t− 1) ≥ pi > U(t− 1)− U(t− 2)
xt−1 + xt−2 if U(t− 1)− U(t− 2) ≥ pi > U(t− 2)− U(t− 3)
· · ·
xt−1 + · · ·+ x1 if U(2)− U(1) ≥ pi > U(1)− U(0)
xt−1 + · · ·+ x0 = N if U(1) ≥ pi
. (15)
Now consider the concave case: U(h)−U(h− 1) is non-increasing. Then the demand function
is
qt(pi) =

0 if pi > U(1)− U(0)
x0 if U(1)− U(0) ≥ pi > U(2)− U(1)
x0 + x1 if U(2)− U(1) ≥ pi > U(3)− U(2)
· · ·
x0 + · · ·+ xt−2 if U(t− 1)− U(t− 2) ≥ pi > U(t− 2)− U(t− 3)
x0 + · · ·+ xt−1 = N if U(t)− U(t− 1) ≥ pi
. (16)
Fig. 4. Demand and supply functions for spot market: convex utility (left), concave utility (right).
Figure 4 shows the supply and demand functions for the convex case (left) and the concave case
(right).
Proof: Proof From the intersection of the demand and supply functions in Figure 4 one can
read off the formulas (17) and (18) for the spot price.
Example 3. An example shows that the allocation achieved by the real time spot market may
not be efficient. In order to compare with the forward market for duration differentiated services,
let cda = crt = C. Consider one consumer and two periods, t = 1, 2, the supplier’s free power
is r1 = 0, r2 = 1. For the convex utility case take U(0) = U(1) = 0, U(2) = 10, C = 8. In slot
Theorem 7 (Real-time market). (a) Suppose U(h) − U(h − 1) is a non-negative, non-
decreasing function of h (with U(0) = 0). Then, the spot price at t is
pit =

min(crt, U(t)− U(t− 1)) if rt < xt−1
min(crt, U(t− 1)− U(t− 2)) if xt−1 ≤ rt < xt−1 + xt−2
min(crt, U(t− 2)− U(t− 3)) if xt−1 + xt−2 ≤ rt < xt−1 + xt−2 + xt−3
· · ·
min(crt, U(1)) if xt−1 + xt−2 + . . .+ x1 ≤ rt < N
0 if N ≤ rt
(17)
(b) Suppose U(h)−U(h−1) is a non-negative, non-increasing function of h (with U(0) = 0).
Then the spot price at t is
pit =

min(crt, U(1)− U(0)) if rt < x0
min(crt, U(2)− U(1)) if x0 ≤ rt < x0 + x1
· · ·
min(crt, U(t)− U(t− 1)) if x0 + · · ·+ xt−2 ≤ rt < x0 + · · ·+ xt−1 = N
0 if N ≤ rt
.
(18)
1, since C > U(1), pi1 = U(1), the consumer will demand 0 power. In slot 2, the price will be
pi2 = U(1) = 0, the consumer’s net benefit will be 0, the producer will receive pi2 = 0. In the
duration-differentiated market (Theorem 6), at the competitive allocation the consumer gets 1
kW for 2 slots and pays U(2) = 10 (so her net benefit is 0), the producer will purchase 1 kW
in the first slot and pay C = 8, and will use the free power p1 in the second slot and get a net
revenue of U(2)− 8 = 2.
For the concave utility case take U(0) = 0, U(1) = U(2) = 5, C = 2. Since U(1) > C, the
producer will supply 1 kW in slot 1 at price pi1 = C = 2. In slot 2, the consumer is indifferent
between 1 kW and 0 kW. She may or not consume p2 = 1 at price pi2 = 0. So the consumer’s
net benefit will be U(1) − C = 3, the producer’s net profit is 0. In the duration-differentiated
competitive allocation, the consumer will only purchase 1 kW in slot 2 at price 0, resulting in
her net utility of 5, the producer’s net profit will again be zero.
Remark 7. Because of the inter-temporal nature of a consumer’s utility, her demand in slot
t is contingent on her consumption in other slots. This contingent demand cannot be met by
the system of spot markets, which is therefore not complete. This system of markets can be
completed through forward markets, like the duration-differentiated market.
VI. RATE-CONSTRAINED ENERGY SERVICES
We have thus far assumed that consumers demand 1 kW for a specified number of time slots.
We now consider a more general energy service, which provides a specified quantity of energy
to be delivered over T time slots. However, the power level in each time slot can assume any
integer value up to a maximum rate m. We will argue that these products can be viewed as
a combination of the duration-differentiated services at a fixed power level of 1 kW presented
before.
Consumer i specifies two quantities: (Ei,mi), Ei is the total energy to be consumed over T
time slots at a maximum rate of mi kW per time slot. Both Ei and mi are integer-valued. For
example, a consumer specifying (100, 10) requires 100 kW-slots of energy with the constraint
that the consumption rate in each time slot is 0, 1, 2, . . . or 10 kW. A consumer specifying
(Ei,mi) is satisfied with any supply allocation At ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mi} such that
∑
tAt = Ei. The
consumer model of section III corresponds to the case where mi = 1.
Consider a consumer whose energy requirement and rate constraint are specified by the pair
(E,m). Let k, r be such that E = km + r with r < m. The following result shows that for
the purpose of allocating supply, a consumer specifying (E,m) is equivalent to a collection
of m consumers with (En = k + 1,mn = 1) for n = 1, 2, . . . , r and (En = k,mn = 1) for
n = r+ 1, . . . ,m. Hence, the adequacy and allocation results of Section III (which were derived
for consumers with m = 1) can be used for the variable rate consumers as well.
Theorem 8. Consider a consumer whose energy requirement and rate constraint are specified
by the pair (E,m). Let k, r be such that E = km + r with r < m. Then, a supply allocation
satisfies
At ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}
∑
t
At = E (19)
if and only if
At =
m∑
n=1
Ant , (20)
where Ant ∈ {0, 1} and
∑
tA
n
t = k + 1 for n ≤ r and
∑
tA
n
t = k for n > r.
Proof: Proof. See Appendix H.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Flexible loads play a critical role in enabling deep renewable integration. They enable demand
shaping to balance supply variability, and thus offer an effective alternative to conventional
generation reserves. In this paper, we study a stylized model of flexible loads. These loads are
modeled as requiring constant power level for a specified duration within a delivery window.
The flexibility resides in the fact that the power delivery may occur at any subset of the total
period.
We consider the supplier’s decision problems for serving a given set of duration differentiated
loads. We offered a complete characterization of supply adequacy, an algorithm for allocating
supply to meet the loads and the optimal policies for making day-ahead and real-time power
purchase decisions. We also study a simplified model of a forward market for these duration
differentiated loads where supply uncertainty is not explicitly taken into account. For this market
model, we present the centralized solution that maximizes social welfare and characterize an
efficient competitive equilibrium. We also contrast this equilibrium with the outcome of a stylized
real-time market.
The theoretical analysis of this work can facilitate further studies required for exploiting load
flexibility. For example, the results of this paper can be used to evaluate the value of flexibility in
reducing supplier’s cost under different forecast models of renewable generation. Further, since
supply adequacy is not assessed at each time instant, forecasting the exact profile of renewable
generation may not be necessary. Instead, the results of this paper suggest that for providing
duration-differentiated services, the key metric to be estimated is the supply-duration vector of
the renewable generation.
A natural extension of this work is to incorporate supply uncertainty into the forward market for
duration-differentiated services. In particular, the supplier should take into account the expected
cost of its real-time power purchases while making its decisions in the forward market. In this
setting, the supplier’s cost function should be given by J(·) defined in (4). The existence and
efficiency of competitive equilibria with this new cost function remains to be ascertained. Further
research with heterogeneous consumers that have different utilities and power requirements is
needed.
APPENDIX
A. Preliminary Majorization Based Results
Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ) and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bT ) be two non-negative vectors arranged in non-
increasing order (that is, at ≥ at+1, and bt ≥ bt+1). The majorization conditions for a ≺ b in
Definition 2 can equivalently be written as
(i)
∑t
s=1 bs ≤
∑t
s=1 as, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, and
(ii)
∑T
s=1 bs =
∑T
s=1 as.
The first condition is equivalent to the following condition: Let c be any rearrangement of b;
then, for any S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T}, there exists S ′ ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T} of the same cardinality as S
such that
∑
s∈S cs ≤
∑
s∈S′ as.
Definition 6. We define a 1 unit Robin Hood (RH) transfer on a as an operation that:
(i) Selects indices t, s such that at > as,
(ii) Replaces at by at − 1 and as by as + 1.
(iii) Rearranges the resulting vector in a non-increasing order.
Lemma 2. Let a˜ be a vector obtained from a after a 1 unit RH transfer. Then, a ≺ a˜.
Proof: Proof. Note a˜ is a rearrangement of the vector aˆ = (a1, a2, . . . , at − 1, . . . , as +
1, . . . , aT ). For any subset S of {1, 2, . . . , T},
(i) if t ∈ S, s ∈ S (or if t /∈ S, s /∈ S), then ∑r∈S aˆr = ∑r∈S ar.
(ii) if t ∈ S, s /∈ S, then ∑r∈S aˆr = ∑r∈S ar − 1.
(iii) if t /∈ S, s ∈ S, then ∑r∈S aˆr = as + 1 + ∑r∈S\{s} aˆr ≤ at + ∑r∈S\{s} aˆr = at +∑
r∈S\s ar.
Therefore, a ≺ a˜ (see the equivalent condition in the definition of majorization).
Lemma 3. Suppose a ≺ b. If for any t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the following conditions hold:
(i) aj = bj for all j < t,
(ii) at − aT ≤ 1.
Then, (a) at = bt, and (b) a = b.
Proof: Proof of Lemma 3. a ≺ b and aj = bj for all j < t imply that
s∑
i=t
bi ≤
s∑
i=t
ai, s = t, t+ 1, . . . , T − 1,
T∑
i=t
ai =
T∑
i=t
bi (21)
In particular, bt ≤ at. If bt < at, then
∑T
i=t bi ≤ (T − t + 1)(at − 1). On the other hand, since
aT ≥ at− 1.
∑T
i=t ai > (T − t+ 1)(at− 1). Therefore,
∑T
i=t ai 6=
∑T
i=t bi, which contradicts the
conditions of the lemma. Thus, bt must be equal to at. Reapplying the first part of the lemma
for i = t + 1, then gives at+1 = bt+1. Proceeding sequentially till T proves the second part of
the lemma.
Lemma 4. Let a ≺ b and a 6= b. Then, there exists a 1 unit RH operation on a that gives a
vector a˜ 6= a satisfying a ≺ a˜ ≺ b.
Proof: Proof. Let t be the smallest index such that at 6= bt. Then, bt < at since
∑t
i=1 bi ≤∑t
i=1 ai and the two vectors have the same first t− 1 elements. Let s > t be the smallest index
such that at−as > 1. Such s must exist, otherwise Lemma 3 would imply that a = b. Consider
a 1 unit RH transfer from t to s. Let a˜ be the resulting vector. Then, by Lemma 2, a ≺ a˜.
Also, if k is the number of elements of a with value equal to at, then the number of elements
of a˜ with value equal to at is k − 1. Therefore, a˜ 6= a.
Further, it is clear that a and a˜ have the same first t − 1 elements (since the RH operation
depleted 1 unit from at and added it to as < at − 1, the non-increasing rearrangement would
not change the t− 1 highest elements.) Similarly, a and a˜ have the same elements from index s
to T . Further, from the definition of s, aj ≥ at − 1 for t ≤ j < s. Since, a˜t, a˜t+1 . . . , a˜s−1, must
be a rearrangement of at − 1, at+1 . . . , as−1, it follows that a˜j ≥ at − 1 for t ≤ j < s.
We now prove that a˜ ≺ b.
(i) If j < t or j ≥ s, then ∑ji=1 a˜i = ∑ji=1 ai ≥∑ji=1 bi.
(ii) If t ≤ j < s, then
j∑
i=1
a˜i =
t−1∑
i=1
ai +
j∑
i=t
a˜i
=
t−1∑
i=1
bi +
j∑
i=t
a˜i ≥
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (j − t+ 1)(at − 1), (22)
where the first and second equalities are true because the first t − 1 elements of a, a˜ and
b are the same, and last inequality follows from the fact that for t ≤ i < s, a˜i ≥ (at − 1).
Moreover,
j∑
i=1
bi =
t−1∑
i=1
bi +
j∑
i=t
bi ≤
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (j − t+ 1)bt ≤
t−1∑
i=1
bi + (j − t+ 1)(at − 1), (23)
where the last inequality follows from bt < at. Equations (22) and (23) imply that
∑j
i=1 bi ≤∑j
i=1 a˜i, or a˜ ≺ b.
Claim 1. Let a ≺ b with a 6= b. Then, there exists a finite sequence of 1 unit RH transfers that
can be applied on a to get b.
Proof: Proof. The claim is established using Lemmas 3 and 4. Let a0 = a.
(i) For n = 1, 2, . . ., if an−1 6= b, use Lemma 4 to construct an 6= an−1 such that an−1 ≺
an ≺ b. Then, an 6= am for any m < n− 1 (otherwise, we would have am = an ≺ an−1 ≺
an =⇒ an = an−1).
(ii) If an−1 = b, stop.
Since there are only finitely many non-negative integer valued vectors that majorize b, this
procedure must eventually stop and it can do so only if an−1 = b, proving the claim.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We require with the following intermediate result.
Lemma 5. For a given demand profile, if a is an exactly adequate supply profile, then any
supply profile b satisfying a ≺ b is also exactly adequate.
Proof: Proof. Without loss of generality, we will assume that a and b are arranged in
non-increasing order. Since b can be obtained from a by a sequence of 1 unit RH transfers
(see Claim 1, Appendix A), we simply need to prove that a 1 unit RH transfer preserves exact
adequacy. Consider an exactly adequate profile a and let A be the corresponding allocation
function. Consider a 1 unit RH transfer from time t to s (without rearrangement) that gives a
new profile a˜. Let i be a load for which A(i, t) = 1 but A(i, s) = 0. Such an i must exist
because
∑
j A(j, t) = at > as =
∑
j A(j, s). Under the new profile, the allocation rule
A˜(j, r) =

A(j, r) r 6= t, s or j 6= i
0 r = t, j = i
1 r = s, j = i
(24)
establishes exact adequacy.
Proof: Proof of Theorem 1 (a): Observe that d is exactly adequate: the allocation function
A(i, t) = 1{t≤hi} meets the exact adequacy requirements under d. Therefore, any p satisfying
p  d is also exactly adequate.
To prove necessity, suppose p is exactly adequate and A is the corresponding allocation function.
Consider any set S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T} of cardinality s. Then, because A(i, t) ∈ {0, 1} and∑T
t=1 A(i, t) = hi, it follows that∑
t∈S
A(i, t) ≤ min(s, hi) =
s∑
t=1
1{t≤hi}. (25)
Summing over i,
N∑
i=1
∑
t∈S
A(i, t) ≤
N∑
i=1
s∑
t=1
1{t≤hi}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
i=1
A(i, t) ≤
s∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
1{t≤hi}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
pt ≤
s∑
t=1
dt for all S with |S| = s
=⇒
s∑
t=1
p↓t ≤
s∑
t=1
dt (26)
For s = T , the inequality in (25) becomes an equality resulting in an equality in (26).
Proof: Proof of Theorem 1 (b): To prove necessity, suppose p is adequate and A is the
corresponding allocation function. Then, clearly, for any set S ⊂ {1, . . . , T} of cardinality s∑
t∈S
pt ≥
∑
t∈S
N∑
i=1
A(i, t) (27)
Further, because A(i, t) ∈ {0, 1} and ∑Tt=1A(i, t) = hi, it follows that∑
t∈S
A(i, t) ≥ max(hi − s+ 1, 0) =
T∑
t=s
1{t≤hi}
Summing over i,
N∑
i=1
∑
t∈S
A(i, t) ≥
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=s
1{t≤hi}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
i=1
A(i, t) ≥
T∑
t=s
N∑
i=1
1{t≤hi}
=⇒
∑
t∈S
N∑
i=1
A(i, t) ≥
T∑
t=s
dt. (28)
Combining (27) and (28) proves the necessity conditions.
To prove sufficiency, let ∆ =
∑T
t=1 pt −
∑T
t=1 dt. Then, ∆ ≥ 0. Consider a new demand profile
d∆ defined as d∆t := dt+ ∆1{t≤1}. This new demand profile corresponds to the original demand
profile augmented with ∆ “fictitious loads” each requiring 1 unit of energy for 1 time slot. It
is easy to see that p w q implies p  d∆. Therefore, by Theorem 1, p is exactly adequate
for the augmented demand profile d∆ which implies that it must be adequate for the original
demand profile q.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Since p is adequate, there must exist at least one allocation function B(i, t) such that∑
t
B(i, t) = hi,
∑
i
B(i, t) ≤ pt.
Let B1 be the set of loads served at time 1 under the allocation rule B(i, t). If A1 6= B1, pick a
load i ∈ A1 \ B1 and j ∈ B1 \A1. Then, hi ≥ hj . Therefore, there must exist a time s > 1 such
that B(i, s) = 1 but B(j, s) = 0. Consider a new allocation rule B1(·, ·) obtained by swapping
the load i at time s and the load j at time 1, that is, the new allocation rule B1 is identical to
B except that for t = 1, s
B1(i, t) = B(j, t) and B1(j, t) = B(i, t).
It is straightforward to establish that the new allocation rule satisfies the adequacy requirements.
One can proceed with this swapping argument one load at a time until the set of loads being
served at time 1 is equal to A1.
For time t > 1, the same swapping argument works after hi are replaced by the number of time
slots each load needs to be served from time t to the final time, which is precisely xi(t).
D. Proof of Theorem 3
We first observe that the strategy described in the theorem is a valid strategy under Case B since
it only uses the information available until time t. Clearly, the prescribed strategy is valid under
Case A as well. We will now show that it yields an adequate supply in the end.
From the definition of a1, we have (p1+a1) w dT . Now assume that (p1+a1, . . . , pt−1+at−1) w
(dT−t+2, . . . , dT ). Then, there exists an at such that (p1 +a1, p2 +a2, . . . , pt−1 +at−1, pt+at) w
(dT−t+1, dT−t+2, . . . , dT ). Thus, the supplier’s optimization problem at time t has a solution. This
is given by min at subject to
pt + at ≥ dT
ps + as + pt + at ≥ dT + dT−1 for all s < T∑
s=s1,s2,...,sk
(ps + as) + (pt + at) ≥ dT−k + · · ·+ dT for all s1 < · · · < sk < t and k ≤ t− 1
It is clear that the prescribed decision strategy results in an adequate net supply since at time
T , the supplier’s optimization ensures that p+ a w d.
We now argue that the prescribed strategy is the optimal one. Let b = (b1, . . . , bT ) ≥ 0 be
the optimal sequence of purchase decisions made in Case A Then, adequacy constrain implies
that p + b w d. Because, the total supply is now adequate, it can be allocated to consumers
according to the LLDF rule.
Starting at time 1, we must have b1 ≥ a1 = (dT − p1)+. Otherwise, (p1 + b1) < dT which means
that p+ b could not be adequate for the given demand. Suppose b1 > a1. Let B1 be the set of
consumers served under a LLDF allocation rule at time 1 when the supply is p+ b and A1 be
the set of consumers served under a LLDF allocation rule at time 1 when the supply is p + a.
Since, p1 +b1 ≥ p1 +a1, B1 ⊃ A1. Let i ∈ B1\A1. Because, we know that p+a is adequate and
that consumer i is not being served at time 1, there must be a future time s such that consumer
i is served at s under the supply p + a but not under p + b. We now consider a modification
of the purchase decisions b constructed as follows:
1) Change b1 to b1 − 1 and not serve consumer i at time 1.
2) At time s, if there was excess power available when the supply was p + b, then use it to
serve consumer i at time s. Otherwise, change bs to bs + 1 with the new unit of power
given to consumer i.
Denote this modified vector of decisions by b˜. It is clear that this modified decision is also
optimal since it ensures adequacy and its total cost does not exceed the cost of b. We can repeat
this argument until b˜1 = a1. Therefore, there is an optimal vector of purchase decisions of the
form (a1, b˜2, . . . , b˜T ).
We now proceed by induction. Suppose that the optimal decision vector is (a1, . . . , at−1, bt, . . . , bT ).
Then, bt ≥ at otherwise p + b 6w d. If bt > at, we can use the same rearrangement
argument used at time 1 to construct modifications of the optimal decision vector that is of
the form (a1, . . . , at, b˜t+1, . . . , b˜T ). Continuing sequentially till the final time T , we conclude
that (a1, . . . , aT ) must be optimal.
For any vector x = (x1, . . . , xT ) define F (x) := maxS⊂{1,2,...,T}
(∑T
s=T−|S|+1 ds −
∑
r∈S xr
)+
.
If a1 > 0, then dT > p1 and therefore the maximum achieving set S in definition of F (p) must
contain time index 1. Let p(1) = (p1 + a1, p2, . . . , pT ). Then, S also achieves the maximum in
the definition of F (p(1)). Therefore,
F (p(1)) = F (p)− a1. (29)
Let p(t− 1) be the supply profile after the first t− 1 purchase decisions. If at > 0, then there
exists a set T ⊂ {1, . . . , t} containing t such that
T∑
s=T−|T |+1
ds −
∑
r∈T
pr(t− 1) > 0 (30)
Let T ∗ be the set for which the above difference is the largest. Then, the maximum achieving
set S in the definition of F (p(t−1)) must contain T ∗. Define p(t) = (p1 +a1, p2 +a2, . . . , pt +
at, pt+1 . . . , pT ). Then, S also achieves the maximum in the definition of F (p(t)). Therefore,
F (p(t)) = F (p(t− 1))− at. (31)
Combining (31) for all t gives
F (p(T )) = F (p)−
T∑
t=1
at =⇒
T∑
t=1
at = F (p)− F (p(T )).
Note that
F (p) = max
S⊂{1,2,...,T}
 T∑
s=T−|S|+1
ds −
∑
r∈S
pr
+
= max
1≤t≤T
(
T∑
s=T−t+1
ds −
T∑
i=T−t+1
p↓r
)+
(32)
Also note that since p(T ) = p+ a, and p+ a w d, it implies that
F (p(T )) = max
1≤t≤T
(
T∑
s=T−t+1
ds −
T∑
r=T−t+1
p↓r(T )
)+
= 0.
Therefore, (32) amounts to
T∑
t=1
at = max
1≤t≤T
(
T∑
s=T−t+1
ds −
T∑
r=T−t+1
p↓r
)+
= max
1≤t≤T
(
T∑
s=t
ds −
T∑
r=t
p↓r
)+
which proves the theorem.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
In order to prove the convexity of J(y), it suffices to prove the convexity of
max
t
(∑
s≥t
(ds − (r+ y)↓s)
)+
for each possible realization r of the renewable supply. Since maximum of convex functions is
convex, it is sufficient to prove that(∑
s≥t
(ds − (r+ y)↓s)
)+
(33)
is convex for all t. (33) can be written as
=
T∑
s=t
ds − minS⊂{1,2,...,T},
|S|=T−t+1
(∑
k∈S
(rk + yk)
)
=
T∑
s=t
ds + maxS⊂{1,2,...,T},
|S|=T−t+1
(
−
∑
k∈S
(rk + yk)
)
(34)
Since (34) is a maximum of affine functions of y, it implies that it is convex in y. This completes
the proof.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: Proof of Part (a) Consider any choice of y so that the total supply is x = r + y.
Without loss of generality, assume that x is arranged in non-increasing order. For t = 1, . . . , T ,
define δt = U(t)−U(t− 1) and define δ0 = 0. Then, δ0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ . . . ≤ δT . For any demand
duration vector that can be served with x, the total utility of consumers is
T−1∑
t=1
(dt − dt+1)U(t) + dTU(T ) =
T∑
t=1
dt(U(t)− U(t− 1)) =
T∑
t=1
dtδt
= δ1(d1 + d2 + . . .+ dT ) + (δ2 − δ1)(d2 + d3 + . . .+ dT )
+(δ3 − δ2)(d3 + . . .+ dT ) + . . .+ (δT − δT−1)dT
=
T∑
j=1
(δj − δj−1)
[
T∑
t=j
dt
]
(35)
where the inequality follows from the fact that δj − δj−1 ≥ 0 and x w d. The profile d∗t = xt
for all t is a valid demand profile that achieves the upper bound on consumer utility. Therefore,
the optimal contracts offered when the supply is x are: the first xT consumers get T duration,
the next xT−1 − xT get T − 1 and in general xi − xi+1 get duration i. In total, x1 consumers
are served. If x = r, the first rT consumers get T duration, the next rT−1 − rT get T − 1 and
in general ri − ri+1 get duration i. Since x = r+ y and y ≥ 0, each consumer’s contract under
x is no less than its contract under r. Therefore, the social welfare problem can be restated as
follows: Let (h1, h2, . . . , hN) be the utility maximizing contracts for the N consumers under the
supply r. Choose a vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zN) of contract increments to maximize
N∑
i=1
(
U(hi + zi)− cdazi
)
(36)
The summation can be maximized by maximizing each term separately which gives that zi =
T − hi if hi ≥ k∗ and 0 otherwise.
Proof: Proof of part (b) Consider any choice of y so that the total supply is x = r + y.
Let
∑T
t=1 xt = Nu(x) + S(x) where u(x) is a non-negative integer and S(x) < N . Then, the
non-increasing increment property of the utility implies that total consumer utility is maximized
if S(x) consumers get contracts of duration u(x) + 1 and N − S(x) consumers get contracts of
duration u(x). When x = r,
∑
t rt consumers get contract of duration 1. Thus, each consumer’s
contract under x is no less than its contract under r. Therefore, the social welfare problem can be
restated as follows: Let (h1, h2, . . . , hN) be the utility maximizing contracts for the N consumers
under the supply r. Choose a vector z = (z1, z2, . . . , zN) of contract increments to maximize
N∑
i=1
(
U(hi + zi)− cdazi
)
(37)
The summation can be maximized term-by-term which yields zi = k∗ − hi.
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: Proof of Part (a) Subject to prices pi(t) = U(t), the profit maximization problem
is given by
max
n≥0, y≥0
T∑
t=1
(ntU(t)− cdayt)
subject to dt =
T∑
i=t
ni
r+ y w d
but ni =
∑N
j=1 1{hj=i}, then
∑T
t=1 ntU(t) is equal to
∑N
i=1 U(hi). Thus, the solution of the profit
maximization problem is equivalent to the solution of the social welfare optimization problem.
Subject to these prices, consumers obtain zero welfare under any allocation. Hence, an efficient
competitive equilibrium exists.
Proof: Proof of part (b) Prices are given by pi(h) = min(cda, U(1))h = µh. The case in
which pi(h) = U(1)h is straightforward. If pi(h) = cdah, it is clear that consumers maximize their
surplus by choosing contracts of duration k∗. This is a result of the non-increasing increments
on U(h) and the condition U(k∗)− U(k∗ − 1) ≥ cda. Hence, the bundle of contracts nk∗ = N
maximizes consumers surplus. Subject to prices pi(h) = cdah, supplier revenue is given by
cda
∑T
t=1 ntt− cda
∑T
t=1 yt = c
da
∑T
t=1 dt− cda
∑T
t=1 yt = c
da(
∑T
t=1 dt−
∑T
t=1 yt) ≤ cda
∑T
t=1 rt.
The bundle, nk∗ = N achieves the upper bound. Hence, an efficient competitive equilibrium
exists.
H. Proof of Theorem 8
Clearly, any supply allocation A(t) that respects (20) also satisfies (19).
To prove the converse, first assume r > 0. Consider an A(t) satisfying (19). Then, A(t) > 0 for
at least k+1 time slots and A(t) = m for at most k time slots. Pick k+1 time slots with largest
value of A(t). Define A1(t) = 1 at the selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let B(t) = A(t)−A1(t).
Then, B(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} and ∑tB(t) = k(m− 1) + (r− 1). If r = 0, then A(t) > 0 for
at least k time slots and A(t) = m for at most k time slots. Pick k time slots with largest value
of A(t). Define A1(t) = 1 at the selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let B(t) = A(t)−A1(t). Then,
B(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} and ∑tB(t) = k(m− 1). Thus, we can always write A(t) as
A(t) = A1t +B(t), (38)
where A1t ∈ {0, 1},
∑
tA
1
t = k + 1{r>0}, B(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and
∑
tB(t) = k(m −
1) + (r − 1)+. Now, if (r − 1) > 0, then B(t) > 0 for at least k + 1 slots and B(t) = m − 1
for at most k slots. Pick k + 1 time slots with largest value of B(t). Define A2(t) = 1 at the
selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let C(t) = B(t) − A2(t). Then, C(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 2} and∑
tB(t) = k(m − 2) + (r − 2). If (r − 1)+ = 0, then B(t) > 0 for at least k time slots and
B(t) = m for at most k time slots. Pick k time slots with largest value of B(t). Define A2(t) = 1
at the selected slots and 0 otherwise. Let C(t) = B(t)−A2(t). Then, C(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 2}
and
∑
tC(t) = k(m− 2). Thus, we can write A(t) as
A(t) = A1t + A
2
t + C(t), (39)
where A2t ∈ {0, 1},
∑
tA
2
t = k + 1{r>1},C(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 2} and
∑
tC(t) = k(m − 2) +
(r − 2)+. Continuing sequentially, we can decompose A(t) into A1(t), . . . , Am(t).
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